The Long Armistice: Un Peacekeeping and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948-1960 by Nathan A Pelcovits

Author:Nathan A Pelcovits [Pelcovits, Nathan A]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Middle Eastern, Social Science, Political Science, World, Regional Studies, General
ISBN: 9781000303063
Google: VAaiDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 49788398
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2019-07-11T00:00:00+00:00

The Scene Shifts to Washington

Although these demands were advanced as essential, it became clear that what Israel sought above all were assurances, not from the United Nations, but from Washington that would effectively keep the Gulf of Aqaba open and deter fedayeen raids from Gaza. Ben Gurion made it quite clear to Eban that he distinguished between "UN guarantees" that were "worthless" and U.S. guarantees that "might satisfy our basic interests." Particularly vital to Israel were assurances that the UN presence would remain at Sharm el-Sheikh until more permanent arrangements could be made and that the United States would commit itself to Israel's right to free and innocent passage.34

With the Hammarskjöld negotiations deadlocked, the center of activity shifted to Washington. The administration was caught in a dilemma. At the UN and within the administration there was talk of sanctions to force Israel to withdraw, and the administration was fully committed to support the United Nations. But domestic opinion was turning favorable to Israel. Israel was attracting widespread support for its demand for free passage in the gulf and security against renewed Egyptian hostility. The administration was not unaffected by these sentiments, and sought a compromise.35

While supporting Hammarskjöld on the basics, the administration was already working on a formula to break the deadlock. The next day (Saturday, February 9) Dulles phoned Eisenhower (then vacationing in Thomasville, Georgia) to lay out the department's line of reasoning: Vital for Israel was assured access to the Gulf of Aqaba. Jerusalem would not be satisfied, said the secretary, with "such hopes as we may hold out for UN action," so "we have to give them assurance outside the context of the UN." Such assurances might take the form of a declaration by a group of maritime nations that the gulf was an international waterway and if the straits were blocked these nations would consider it an act of aggression. As for Gaza, under the armistice agreement it had been "turned over" to Egypt for administration and policing. The United States would like to see UNEF go in and control it but this had to be worked out on a voluntary basis. In any event, "we don't think this is vital from the standpoint of the Israelis."36

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